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THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODECOMMERCIAL PAPER
Part 3. Rights of a Holder

Ross C.

TISDALE*

N TWO PREVIOUS articles published in'the North Dakota Law
Review in 19501 and 19512 the writer undertook a survey of the
Uniform Commercial Code provisions relating to commercial paper
to determine how extensive its effect on present law would be if it
were enacted in North Dakota. This paper is in furtherance of that
project and takes up the discussion where the last article left it.
While the final draft of the Code has been issued since that time,'
most of the changes in the final draft have related to matters of
form, with but one or two exceptions noted below. 4 The instant
study, of course, is keyed to the official draft published in 1952. 5
To facilitate comparison with existing law the provisions of the
Code will be set out in full in the text.
The Commercial Code chapter relating to holders of negotiable
instruments commences with an inclusive statement of their rights:
Section 3-301. RIGHTS OF A HOLDER. The holder of an
instrument whether or not he is the owner may transfer or
negotiate it and, except as otherwise provided in Section 3-603

0

Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
1. Tisdale, Uniform Commercial Code - Commercial Paper, Part I, Form and Interpretation. 26 N.D. Bar Briefs 252 (1950).
2. Tisdale, Uniform Commercial Code - Commercial Paper, Part II, Transfer and
Negotiation, 27 N.Dak.L:Rev. 383 (1951).
3. Final approval of all Articles except 4 and 5 was given at a joint meeting of the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute, and Articles 4
and 5 were finally approved on September 15, 1951. However, further recommendations for
change were approved by the Editorial Board at meetings held in December, 1952, and
February, 1953, and were subsequently approved by the Institute and the Commissioners.
4. U.C.C. § 3-106 omits clause (f) "'upon acceleration or after extension." Reason:
* 3-109 validates these clauses and (f) was unnecessary.
U.C.C. § 3-107 was re-written for clarity and an added clause was inserted to make
it clear that an instrument payable in a "stated sum in a foreign currency is for a sum
certain in money" although it may be satisfied by payment in dollars, the amount being
determined by the number of dollars the foreign money will bring at the buying sight rate
for that currency on the date of payment or demand.
U.C.C. § 3-108 omits provision as to interest in subsection (2), since the same
question is covered in § 3-122 (4) (a).
U.C.C. § 3-110 has been rewritten for clarity with no change in substance.
U.C.C. § 3-114 has been omitted entirely.
U.C.C. § 3-123 has been rewritten and extended, and renumbered as § 3-122.
U.C.C. § 3-206 has been redrafted to clarify the position of a collecting bank as a
holder in due course if it applies value on an account as ordered, whether the indorsement
is in blank or special, provided it is for collection or deposit.
5. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, Uniform Commercial Code (Official Draft,
Text and Comments Edition, 1952), hereinafter referred to as the "Code" and cited
U.C.C.
--.
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on payment or satisfaction, discharge it or enforce payment in
his own name.
This section restates and broadens §51 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (hereinafter N.I.L.),6 to make it clear that all holders are included within the meaning of the section. While it covers
most of the rights of a holder, certain provisions relating to the
discharge of negotiable instruments are contained in a later section,
and the reference to §3-603 contained in the above section is necessary to make it cover all of the holder's rights.
N.I.L. §51 required that payment be in due course to discharge an instrument.7 This requirement has been abandoned in the
Code as impractical and unfair, with obvious justification. The
primary debtor should be entitled to pay the holder of his note or
bill even though he has notice of adverse claims unless the adverse
claimant takes appropriate steps to protect his interest. Under the
provision referred to above, the adverse claimant has alternative
courses open. He may enjoin, he may give bond, or he may do
nothing - in which case the primary debtor need not hesitate in
paying the holder. The change in the law which will result seems
desirable and in line with sound practice. The obligation of the
paying party is to pay the holder and he should have a right to do
so unless restrained or indemnified.
Section 3-302. HOLDER IN DUE COURSE. (1) A holder in
due course is a bolder who takes the instrument
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith including observance of the reasonable
commercial standards of any business in which the holder
may be engaged; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored
or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any
person

(2) A payee may be a holder in due course.
(3) A holder does not become a holder in due course of al
instrument:
(a) by purchase of it at judicial sale or by taking it under
legal process; or
(b) by acquiring it in taking over an estate; or
(c) by purchasing it as part of a bulk transaction not in
regular course of business of the transferor
(4) A purchaser of a limited interest can be a holder in due
course only to the extent of the interest purchased.
-6. N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0501 (1943).
7. The due course requirement appears also in N.I.L.

Rev. Code § § 41-0718 and 41-0901 (1943).

88 and 119, being N.D.
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This section also restates, broadens and improves the corresponding provisions in the N.I.L. Section 52 of the N.I.L.5 specifies
four things necessary to a holder in due course status. The first requirement of that section, that the instrument be "complete and
regular on its face" is actually a problem of notice and has been so
treated in North Dakota.' Minor irregularities do not prevent a
holder from claiming the due course status.'0 This portion of §52
has been transferred in the Code to the appropriate section on
notice, discussed infra.
The second requirement of §52, that the holder take before the
instrument is overdue "and without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact," is restated in clause (1)
(c) of §3-302 with no apparent intent to change the law. The problem here relates to demand instruments matured by demand and
negotiated within a reasonable time after issue, or instruments subject to acceleration negotiated after exercise of the power to accelerate."I The problem again is one of notice and the matter is treated
in detail under that heading.
The third requirement of §52, that one take in good faith and
for value, has received a refurbishing at the hands of the drafters
of the Code. Value is set by itself, 12 and the good faith requirement has been enlarged in view of the requirement of the Code
that good faith be construed to mean actual good faith.13 It has
been suggested that the new requirement that the holder observe
the reasonable commercial standards of any business in which he
may be engaged takes the law back to the pre-N.I.L. days and the
suspicious circumstances rule. 1 4 However, the North Dakota Supreme Court has applied the same standard to lawyers,"5 bankers, "
and business men' 7 as a part of the good faith principle.
8. N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0502 (1943).
9. Farmers State Bank v. Koffler, 60 N.D. 11, 232 N.W. 307, 70 A.L.R. 1223 (1930);
Union State Bank v. Benson, 38 N.D. 396, 165 N.W. 509 (1917).
10. Farmers State Bank v. Koffler, supra note 9.
N.W. 69 (1929); Accord, Levy v. Radkay, 223 Mass. 29, 123 N.E. 97 (1919).

11. Compare: Cedar Rapids Nat. Bank v. Snoozy, 55 N.D. 655, 215 N.W. 96 (1927)
(automatic acceleration clause involved).
12. U.C.C. § 3-303.
13. "Good

faith"

means

honesty in

fact

in

the

conduct

or transaction

concerned.

U.C.C. § 1-201 (19).
14. Symposium: The Uniform Commercial Code - The Effect of Its Adoption in Tennessee. 22 Tenn.L.Rev. 776, 820-21 (1953).
15. Knowlton v. Schultz, 6 N.D. 417, 71 N.W. 550 (1897).
16. Bank v. Garceau, 22 N.D. 576, 134 N.W. 882 (1912); Stockyards Nat. Bank of
St. Paul v. First Nat. Bank of Towner, 249 Fed. 421 (8th Cir. 1918); cf. Bank v. Kingsland,
5 N.D. 263, 65 N.W. 697 ;(1895).
17. Smith v. Courant Co.; 23 N.D. 297, 136 N.W. 781 (1912); Walters v. Rock, 18
N.D. 45, 115 N.W. 511 (1908).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

The last requirement of §52, that the holder take without
notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in title of the
person negotiating it, has been restated in the words "or of any
defense against or claim to it on the part of any person." The change
is advisable to make it clear that any defense that would prevent
recovery by the original holder should prevent recovery by the
holder who takes with notice. That, of course, has always been the
law but unfortunately under the N.I.L. some few cases had reached
the conclusion that under §5911 of that act, only defects in title
would shift the burden of proof on the holder in due course issue,
and since §559 did not specify want and failure of consideration
as defects in title, the burden would remain on the defendant to
prove that the plaintiff had notice of such defenses. North Dakota
so held in an early decision.20 Although this case has not been cited
for this point in later cases, and one case to the contrary is cited
below, 21 the law of North Dakota would appear to be in doubt on
the point - an uncertainty obviated by the Code.
Subsection two represents new material and would result in
a change in the law of North Dakota. There appear to be no cases
in this state holding that a payee can be a holder in due course.
Several cases preceding the adoption of the N.I.L. 22 indicate that
under the law as it stod then2: a payec could not be a holder in due
course, on the ground the payee does not take by indorsement.
It is probable that the common law drew no sharp distinction
between a holder in due course and a bona fide purchaser, and
authority exists for the proposition that a payee satisfying the re24
quirement of purchase for value took free of equities of defense.
18. "Every holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due course; but when it is
shown that the title of any person who has negotiated the instrument was defective, the
burden is on the holder to prove that he or some person under whom he claims acquired the

title as a holder in due course . . ." N.I.L. § 59, N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0509 (1943).
19. "The title of a person who negotiates an
of this title when he obtained the instrument, or
force and fear, or other unlawful means, or for an
it in breach of faith, or under such circumstances

instrument is defective within the meaning
any signature thereto, by fraud, duress, or
illegal consideration, or when he negotiates
as amount to a fraud." N.I.L. § 55, N.D.

Rev. Code § 41-0505 (1943).
20. Commercial Security Co. v. Jack, 29 N.D. 67, 150 N.W. 460 (1914).
21. In First Nat. Bank v. Carroll, 46 N.D. 62, 67, 179 N.W. 664 (1920), Birdzell, J.,
states: "When the defendant offered evidence of the true consideration for the note,
it was incumbent on the bank to show that it or someone through whom it claimed title was
a holder in due course . .. When evidence was offered impugning the right of the defendant

to recover the face of the note, a prima facie case is no longer sufficient."
22. McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Taylor, 5 N.D. 53, 63 N.W. 890 (1895);
Porter v. Andrus, 10 N.D. 558, 88 N.W. 567 (1901).
23. "An indorsee in due course is one who, in good faith, in the ordinary course of
business, and for value, before its apparent maturity or presumptive dishonor, and without

knowledge of its actual dishonor, acquires a negotiable instrument duly indorsed to him, or
indorsed generally, or payable to the bearer." Dak. Comp. Laws (1887), § 4487.
24. 8 Am. Jur. § 374, n. 16; see Note, 32 A.L.R. 289, 294-97 (1924); 10 C.J.S.
§ 305; Western Surety Co. v. Fredericks, 63 N.W.2d 565 (Minn. 1954).
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Under the N.I.L., however, the question becomes a technical one:
can a payee take by negotiation?
Sections 52(4) and 3021 of the N.I.L. carry the implication
that a payee takes by issuance and not by negotiation; and under
a literal interpretation of the act it is possible to argue that the
payee is the first holder capable of negotiating it. However, it has
been suggested by an able writer that the real purpose of §52 of
the N.I.L was not to require that negotiation by the first holder
qualify the holder in due course status, but rather to show what
constituted a taking in good faith and what constituted a taking in
bad faith.2 1" In other words, the word "negotiated" in §52(4) is
used in the broad sense of "take."
Those cases accepting the view that the payee can be a holder
in due course must necessarily do so by refusing to give a literal
interpretation to the N.I.L. The Code accepts this as the preferable view, substituting "takes the instrument" for the word "negotiated." The result is that a payee may become a holder in due
course under the same conditions as any other holder and whether
he takes directly from the maker or drawer or not. Those courts
accepting the view that a payee cannot be a holder in due course
stress the fact that the instrument must be negotiated to the holder,
and conclude from the fact that the payee is an original party
named in the instrument that such a result is impossible. "7 It is
quite evident, however, that there is a distinction between a payee
who is also a promisee in a contract giving rise to the instrument
and hence in privity with the maker or drawer in the ordinary
sense, and a payee who purchases the instrument for value, whether
through the intervention of an agent or directly from the maker or
drawer. By simply stating that "a payee may be a holder in due
course," the Code offers an equitable solution to a vexatious problem. Included in the comments for the guidance of the practitioner

25. Section 30 of the N.I.L., N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0401 (1943), provides: "An instrument is negotiated when it is transferred from one person to another in such manner as to
constitute the transferee the holder thereof. If payable to bearer it is negotiated by delivery,
if payable to order, it is negotiated by the endorsement of the holder completed by delivery."
Some courts insist that this section should be construed in the light of the definition
of "holder" found in § 191 of the N.I.L., N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0102 (1943). As so construed, the last line in the section would read: "It is negotiated by the endorsement of the
holder or payee completed by delivery." Liberty Trust Co. v. Tilton, 217 Mass. 462, 465,

105 N.E. 605 (1915).
26. Britton, Bills and Notes § 122 (1943). See also Beutel's Brannan Negotiable Instruments Law 675-76 (7th ed. 1948).
27. For example: Britton Milling Co. v. Williams, 44 S.D. 464, 184 N.W. 265, aff'don
rehearing, 45 S.D. 274,

187 N.W. 159

(1922).

A recent case has adopted the contrary

view. Western Surety Co. v. Friedricks, 63 N.W.2d 565 (Mnn. 1954).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

are typical examples of fact situations where the payee may occupy
the status of a holder in due course."8
Subsection three of §3-302 is intended to state existing case
law. It specifies three types of cases where the holder is a mere
transferee or successor in interest because of unusual circumstances.
Typical fact situations are illustrated by two North Dakota cases
cited below.20
Subsection four restates the principle of §27 of the N.I.L. :0
The cases hold that a pledgee may be holder in due course to the
extent of his interest, but defenses good against the pledgor remain
available to the extent of the pledgor's interest in the insrument. :;
Section 3-303. TAKING FOR VALUE. A holder takes the instrument for value
(a) to the extent that the agreed consideration has been
performed or that he acquires a security interest in or a
lien on the instrument otherwise than by legal process;
or
(b) when he takes the instrument in payment of or as
security for an antecedent claim against any person
whether or not the claim is due; or
(c) when he gives a negotiable instrument for it or makes an
irrevocable commitment to a third person.
The section above divorces value from consideration. While
the cases have always recognized that a distinction exists, the N.I.L.
failed to draw a clear line. Consideration, obviously, goes to the
question whether the obligation of any party to the instrument can
28.. U.C.C. § 3-302, Comment 3. "In the following cases, among others, the payee
is a holder in due course:
a. A remitter, purchasing goods from P, obtains a bank draft payable to P and forwards
it to P, who takes it for value, in good faith and without notice as required by this section.
b. The remitter buys the bank draft payable to P, but it is forwarded by the bank
directly to P, who takes it in good faith and without notice in payment of the remitter's
obligation to him.
c. A and B sign a note as co-makers. A induces B to sign by fraud, and without authority from B delivers the note to P, who takes it for value, in good faith and without notice.
d. A defrauds the maker into signing an instrument payable to P.
P pays A for it in
good faith and without notice and the maker delivers the instrument directly to P.
e. D draws a check payable to P and gives it to his agent to be delivered to P in
payment of D's debt. The agent delivers it to P, who takes it in good faith and without
notice in payment of the agent's debt to P. But as to this case see Section 3-204 (2) (b),
which may apply.
f. D draws a check payable to B but blank as to the amount, and gives it to his agent to
be delivered to P. The agent fills in the check with an excessive amount, and P takes it
for value, in good faith, and without notice.
g. D draws a check blank as to the name of the payee, and gives it to his agent
to be filled in with the name of A and delivered to A. The agent fills in the name of P
and P takes the check in good faith, for value and without notice.
29. MeAdam v. Grand Forks Mercantile Co., 24 N.D. 645, 140 N.W. 725 (1913);
Stockyards Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 249 Fed. 421 (8th Cir. 1918).
30. N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0304 (1943).
31. Bank v. Werner, 19 N.D. 485, 126 N.W. 100 (1910); and compare facts in Bank v.
Kingsland, 5 N.D. 263, 65 N.W. 697 (1895), and Stockyards Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank,
249 Fed. 421 (8th- Cir. 1918).
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be enforced against him. Value determines whether the holder
can qualify as a particular kind of holder- i.e., whether he is a
holder in due course, and therefore takes free of defenses, including
failure or want of consideration.
Section 26 of the N.I.L.3 2 has been omitted as misleading and
unnecessary. That section provides: "Where value has at any time
been given for the instrument, the holder is deemed a holder for
value in respect to all parties who become such prior to that time."
An inference that could be drawn from the section of the N.I.L.
in question is that a holder who had not himself given value could
qualify as a holder in due course if any prior party had given
value. Of course such an inference would be unreasonable unless
the prior party giving value was a holder in due course, but in view
of the ambiguity the drafters omitted the section and have taken
up the contract of the accommodation party, to which this section
relates, in a single section under liability of the parties.:
In comparing the N.I.L. with the provisions of the Code, it will
be noted first that §27 of N.I.L.,"' covering liens, has been modified
to correspond with the view of the Code that one acquiring an instrument through legal process is not a holder in due course. The
first line in §25 of the N.I.L.:t5 that, "value is any consideration
sufficient to support a simple contract," no longer expresses the law.
Value and consideration are separated. On the other hand, the
last line is retained: "An antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value; and is deemed such whether the instrument is payable
on demand or at a future date." On the whole the language of the
Code is broader since it refers to a claim "against any person
whether or not the claim is due."
The last clause of §3-303 is new but represents existing case
law. The possibility that the negotiable instrument given in payment may pass into the hands of a holder in due course is generally
recognized as sufficient reason for holding it to be value within
the holder in due course rule."' The same thing should be true as
to any irrevocable committment by the purchaser of the in7
strument.1
32. N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0303 (1943).
33. U.C.C. § 3-415.
34. N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0304 (1943).
35. Ibid., § 41-0302.
36. Citizens State Bank of Enderlin v. Skeffington, 50 N.D. 494, 196 N.W. 953 (1924);
First National Bank v. Wallace, 50 N.D. 330, 196 N.W. 303 (1923).
37. An irrevocable letter of credit illustrates the point: Continental Nat. Bank v. National City Bank, 69 F.2d 312 (9th Cir. 1934).
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To sum up, the section restates the N.I.L. and existing case
law for the purpose of clarification, and makes no substantial change
in existing law.
Section 3-304. NOTICE TO PURCHASER. (1) The purchaser has notice of a claim or defense if
(a) the instrument is so incomplete, bears such visible evidence of forgery or alteration, or is otherwise so irregular as to call into question its validity, terms or ownership or to create an ambiguity as to the party to pay; or
(b) the purchaser has notice that the obligation of any party
is voidable in whole or in part, or that all parties have
been discharged.
(2) The purchaser has notice of a claim against the instrument
when he has reasonable grounds to believe
(a) that the transfer to him is a preference voidable under
the law of bankruptcy or insolvency;
(b) that a fiduciary has negotiated the instrument in payment of or as security for his own debt or in any transaction for his own benefit or otherwise in breach of
duty.
(3) Except as provided with respect to conditional, trust or
collection indorsements in the course of bank collections (Sections 4-203 and 4-205), the purchaser also has notice of a claim
against the instrument if it has previously been indorsed conditionally or in such manner as to prohibit further negotiation
and such indorsement has not been cancelled.
(4) The purchaser has notice that an instrument is overdue
if he has reasonable grounds to believe
(a) that any part of the principal amount is overdue or that
there is an uncured default in payment of another instrument of the same series; or
(b) that acceleration of the instrument has been made; or
(c) that he is taking a demand instrument after demand
has been made or more than a reasonable length of time
after its issue A reasonable time for a check drawn and
payable with the states and territories of the United
States and the District of Columbia is presumed to be
thirty days.
(5) Knowledge of the following facts does not of itself give the
purchaser notice of a defense or claim
(a) that the instrument is antedated or postdated;
(b) that it was issued or negotiated in return for an executory promise or accompanied by a separate agreement,
unless the purchaser has notice that a defense or claim
has arisen from the terms thereof;
(c) that any party has signed for accommodation;
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(d) that an incomplete instrument has been completed, unless the purchaser has notice of any improper completion;
(e) that any person negotiating the instrument is or was a
fiduciary;
(f) that there has been default in payment of interest on the
instrument or in payment of any other instrument except
one of the same series.
(6) The filing or recording of a document does not of itself
constitute notice within the provisions of this Article to a person
who would otherwise be a holder in due course.
(7) To be effective notice must be received at such time and in
such manner as to give a reasonable opportunity to act on it.
Courts have been greatly troubled by the problem of notice,
and one of the reasons for this is the fact that "good faith" as a
positive requirement is subjective in nature, and its, converse bad
faith has also seemed to the courts to be subjective. Thus, the requirement of §56 of the N.I.L., :! that a purchaser must have
actual knowledge "or knowledge of such facts that his action in
taking the instrument amounted to bad faith" has led some courts
astray on notice questions because notice is objective in nature and
to bring in the element of bad faith appeared to fly in the face of
the rule requiring actual notice of defenses. The result has been
conflict in the decisions in most of the areas covered by this section
-a conflict the Code seeks to avoid by spelling out the fact situations where the section will apply.
The Code retains the idea of actual notice by using the phrase
"reasonable grounds to believe" thus escaping the contradiction
implicit in defining good faith in negative terms and also requiring
the application of an objective test in determining notice questions.
The section under discussion covers matters found in sections
45, 52, 53, 55 and 56 of the N.I.L.:"' The section is based upon the
definition of notice found in the general definition section of the
Code, which provides as follows:
A person has "notice" of a fact when
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or
(b) he has received a notice or notification of it; or
(c) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the
4
time in question he has reason to know that it exists. '1
38. N.D. Rev. Code
39. N.D. Rev. Code

41-0505 (1943).
I§ 41-0416, 41-0502,

40. U.C.C. § 1-201 (25).

41-0503, 41-0505, 41-0506

(1943).
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Section 45 of the N.I.L.4 1 creates a presumption that negotiation took place prior to maturity. It is no longer necessary and has
been dropped. Under the Code the taker may rely on the date of
issuance in the case of demand paper, and on the stated maturity
date in the case of time paper. He will be granted holder in due
course status although the prior holder had made demand or attempted to accelerate prior to negotiation, if the taker is without
42
notice of that fact.
Section 53 of the N.I.L. 43 is retained in subsection (4) (c),
with the added presumption that a check becomes stale in 30 days.
The purpose here of course is to bring the law in line with "the
realities of the collection process. Thirty days allows the business
man or the farmer a reasonable period of time to deposit the check
and still retain the right of recourse against the drawer. Indorsers
under the act, however, are entitled to greater promptness and are
discharged unless bank collection or presentment occurs within
seven days after the endorsement is made. 44
Section 55 of the N.I.L. 43 enumerates certain things which
render title defective. As indicated in the discussion of the holder
in due course requirements under the Code, many courts assumed
this to be a complete list, and that defenses not enumerated therein,
such as failure or want of consideration, would not render title
defective. 4" This approach has been abandoned in the Code, as
has the terminology found in this group of sections in the N.I.L.
Defects of title and infirmities in the instrument might be
thought of as the equivalent of "a defense against or claim to" an
instrument on the part of any person. Unfortunately, the N.I.L. is
not clear as to the exact meaning of these terms, and the separate
treatment of defective titles in §55 suggests that a distinction of
some kind -not explained in the act.- must exist. The language
of the Code removes this doubt; any claim to the instrument or defense available to any party against the payee shifts the burden.
Notice of such a claim or defense prevents assumption of the status
of holder in due course. The only exception to this rule involves the
discharge of a party, of which the taker has notice, but leaves
other parties liable on the instrument - as to those parties remain41. N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0416 (1943).
42. U.C.C. §§ 3-302 (1) (e), 3-304 (4)
43. N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0503 (1943).

(b-c).

44. U.C.C. § 3-503.

45. N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0505 (1943).
46. Commercial Security Co. v. Jack, 29 N.D. 67, 150 N.W. 460 (1914).
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ing liable the taker may be a bolder in due course despite notice
47
of the particular discharge.
Subdivision (1) (a) removes from the list of prerequisites for
a holder in due course set out in §52 of the N.I.L., and transfers to
the notice section in the Code, the provision that the instrument
must be complete and regular on its face. The language has been
strikingly revised because it is now treated as a question of notice,
and properly so. To illustrate, a holder should not be charged with
notice of defenses simply because the instrument contains a minor
discrepancy having nothing to do with the defense asserted. 48 To
hold otherwise would impose a form of constructive notice contrary to the provisions of the N.I.L. On the other hand, the instrument may bear on its face a warning that something is wrong, and
it is properly a question of fact whether the warning is sufficient to
49
put the taker on notice of the asserted defense.
Subdivision (1) (b) deals with a point on which the N.I.L. is
silent, to wit: does notice that a particular party has a defense on
the instrument - as distinguished from an off-set or counterclaim prevent the taker from assuming the status of holder in due course
as to other parties who remain bound thereon? After all, a piece of
paper cannot be discharged. Rather, it is the contractual obligation
of one or more of the parties that is discharged. Recognizing that
notice of the discharge of a particular party gives no warning of
defenses available to other parties, the drafters took the practical
view that discharge is strictly a personal matter; and the holder may
be in due course as to other parties although he has notice of the
fact that a particular party has been discharged from liability. 50
If all parties are discharged, of course no one can be a holder in
due course.
Subsection (2) (a) is new, and is an attempt to harmonize the
Code with the bankruptcy act. Under present law there is nothing
in §52 of the N.I.L. to prevent an indorsee from being a holder in
due course although he takes an instrument on a past debt with
knowledge that the indorser is insolvent. Clearly such a transfer
depletes the assets of the debtor and hence should be voidable by
47. U.C.C. § 3-305 (e).
48. Farmers State Bank of Dickinson v. Koffler, 60 N.D. 11, 232 N.W. 307, 70 A.L.R.
1223 (1930).
49. Union State Bank v. Benson, 38 N.D. 396, 165 N.W. 509 (1917) (notations on
margin of note); Stockyards Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 249 Fed. 421 (8th Cir. 1918)
(form of indorsement carrying notice of possible pledge).
50. "No discharge of any party provided by this Article is effective against a subsequent
holder in due course unless he has notice thereof when he takes the instrument." U.C.C.
§ 3-602.
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a trustee in bankruptcy as a preferential transfer in an appropriate
case. 5
Subsection (2) (b) adopts the policy of section 6 of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, specifying the same elements as notice of improper conduct. Although this act has not been adopted in North
Dakota, the law appears to be in accord.5 2 However, subdivision
(5) (e) indicates that mere knowledge that the person dealing with
the instrument is a fiduciary is not notice of a claim or defense.
Thus, where the purchaser pays out cash rather than applying it
on a past debt owed him by the indorser he may be fully protected
as a holder in due course unless actual notice of the breach of trust
is brought home to him. This section merely spells out a principle
implicit in the requirement of the N.I.L. that the holder should not
act in bad faith in taking the instrument.
Subsection (3) represents a change in the law in one respect.
The Code abandons the concept of restrictive indorsement and substitutes the principle of conditional indorsement When the instrument is in the collection process a bank may become a holder in
due course when it has parted with value, but any other purchaser
is charged with notice of a claim against the instrument. The whole
concept is new and the reader is referred back to a previous
discussion. 5

Subsections (4) and (5) cover areas of conflict in the law of
negotiable instruments, and hence have the advantage of subsituting certainty in matters where the N.I.L. was largely silent. Knowledge of anything that matures the instrument, of course, prevents
one from being a holder in due course. But here too, a distinction
must be drawn between notice of facts that arouse mere suspicion
as distinguished from notice of facts that would indicate bad faith
on the part of the taker. Thus, because a default in payment of an
installment of interest is not an uncommon thing, notice of such a
default is not sufficient under the Code to charge a purchaser with
notice that the instrument is overdue. On the other hand, a default
in payment of principal is a serious matter that does charge the
holder with notice that the instrument is overdue.
In like manner, knowledge that default in payment of a note
in a series has occurred prevents one from being a holder in due

51. 52 Stat. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (b) (1946).
52. Emerado Farmers Elevator Co. v. Farmers Bank of Emerado, 20 N.D. 270, 127 N.W.
522 (1910).
63. Tisdale, supra note 2, at 390-95.
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course of another note in the same series; 11but if a defaulted note
is not one of a series a purchaser has a right to rely upon the face
of the instrument purchased, and notice that the maker has defaulted on another 'note will not prevent his being a holder in' due
course. The obligations are independent.
Provisions in subdivision (4) (b) and (c) tie in with the previous section on holder in due course, rejecting any implication that
might be raised by §52 (2) of the N.I.L., that if the instrument has
in fact been accelerated or matured by prior demand one taking
without notice could not be a holder in due course. But the rule of
§53 of the N.I.L.;5 requiring negotiation of a demand instrument
in a reasonable time after issue, is retained.
Subdivisions (b) and (d) of subsection (5) require special
mention. A. noted in a previous article, a change in the law of
North Dakota could result where a collateral document accompanies
a note." ' The Code adopts the rule that instruments which travel
together are construed as a single instrument. Hence a provision in
a collateral contract purporting to qualify the promise in the note
is binding on the holder if he takes with notice, and the converse
of this would also appear to be true. Thus an acceleration clause
in a mortgage might purport to govern the note; under the Code; .
the holder could accelerate the note although no such clause appeared therein, a view not now accepted in North Dakota.
The comments indicate that subdivision (d) will effect a
change in existing law. The Code envisages filling in blanks in the
presence of the purchaser. The taker becomes a holder in due
course unless he has notice of an improper completion of the instrument. The requirement that one take an instrument complete and
regular on its face, when set out as prerequisite of a holder in due
course would seem inconsistent with this result; but the Code
obviates this objection by making this a question of notice. The
Code puts the responsibility where it belongs, on the shoulders of
the person who put the instrument in circulation with blanks in it.
Subsection (6) is new, but has found general acceptance in
case law, and its statement here will remove any doubt as to the
cffect of filing or recording.
Subdivision (7) also is new and is based upon a general
principle of construction governing the entire Code, as follows:
54. See Cedar Rapids Nat. Bank. v. Snoozy, 55 N.D. 655, 215 N.W. 96 (1927).
55. N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0503 (1943).
56. Tisdale, supra note 1, at 267-69.

57. U.C.C. § 3-119.
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A person "receives" a notice or notification when
(a) it comes to his attention; or
(b) it is duly delivered at the place of business through
which the contract was made or at any other place held
out by him as the place for receipt of such communications.
Notice or a notification received by an organization is effective
for a particular transaction fom the time which it is brought to
the attention of the individual conducting that transaction,
and in any event from the time which it would have been
brought to his attention if the organization had exercised due
diligence."8
In short, under the Code, notice must be received in sufficient
time to act upon it where an institution such as a bank is concerned.
In summation, the section on notice represents an advance
over the N.I.L. and is an attempt to set at rest conflicts that have
arisen under existing law. While the section is long, it has the advantage of certainty in meaning lacking in the N.I.L.
Section 3-305. RIGHTS OF A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE.
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes
the instrument free from
(1) all claims to it on the part of any person; and
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom
the holder has not dealt except
(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a
simple contract; and
(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of
the transaction, as renders the obligation of the
party a nullity; and
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party
to sign the instrument with neither knowledge
nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge
of its character or its essential terms; and
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has
notice when he takes the iristrument.
Section 57 of the N.I.L.59 purports to deal with the rights of a
holder in due course as such; but sections 15 and 16 of the N.I.L., 0
among others, also bear on the question. Section 15 makes nondelivery of an incomplete instrument a real defense, while §16
makes nondelivery and conditional delivery for a special purpose
a personal defense cut off by negotiation to a holder in due course.
58. U.C.C. § 1-201 (27).
59. N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0507 (1943).
60. N.D. Rev. Code § § 41-0215, 41-0206 (1943).
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Since the Code specifies "all claims" and "defenses" it includes the
subject to delivery. However, the Code goes further and reverses
the rule of §15 on the ground that the holder takes the instrument
in reliance on a genuine signature whether or not it was complete
at the time of negotiation. He may nontheless become a holder in
due course if he had no notice that the completion was unauthorized although the blanks were filled in his presence. This change in
viewpoint is in line with authorities holding that estoppel applies
against a negligent maker or drawer. 1
Under the Code the burden of establishing defenses rests
upon the defendant,6 2 hence the "conclusive presumption" in favor
of a holder ir due course set out in §16 of the N.I.L. has been
deleted. An oversimplification in regard to burden of proof might be
stated as follows: (1) the burden of establishing a defense is upon
the defendant; (2) in the absence of any defense any holder is entitled to recover; (3) where a defense is relied upon the plaintiff
may either (a) rebut the defense or (b) establish his status as a
holder in due course. In other words the Code substitutes for a
presumption a rule cutting off the defense. The plaintiff needs no
presumption of this nature to aid him, and should not recover if a
defense is established unless he is a holder in due course.
Paragraphs (a) to (e) of subsection (2) are new, and follow
the course of decisions under the N.I.L. In general they envisage no
change in local law, and simply round out the section by enumerating what have been termed "real" defenses available even against
a holder in due course.
Simplicity and clarity make this section a distinct improvement
over prior treatment in the N.I.L.
Section 3-306. RIGHTS OF ONE NOT HOLDER IN DUE
COURSE. Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course
any person takes the instrument subject to
(a) all valid claims to it on the part of any person; and
(b) all defenses of any party which would be available in
an action on a simple contract; and
(c) the defenses of want or failure of consideration, nonperformance of any condition precedent, non-delivery,
or delivery for a special purpose; and
61. Putnam v. Sullivan, 4 Mass. 45, 3 Am. Dec. 206 (1808) (notes indorsed and delivered to maker, blanks to be filled in for amount of debt); Heimberg v. Lincoln Nat. Bank,
113 N.J.L. 76, 172 Atl. 528 (1934) (blank check bearing signature of drawer stolen fron
office safe); Thomas v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 7 F.Supp. 205 (E.D.Mich. 1934). The
cases are divided on the question as to whether a holder in due course status is possible;
but many cases support the view that a depositor owes a duty to the drawee bank and is
estopped to set up nondelivery.
62. U.C.C. § 3-307 (2).
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(d) the defense that he or a person through whom he holds
the instrument acquired it by theft. The claim of any
third person to the instrument is not otherwise available
as a defense to any party liable thereon unless the third
person himself defends the action for such party
The previous section covered the rights of a holder in due
course or one claiming through a holder in due course. This section
is limited to a holder who cannot so qualify and would include for
example, a bona fide purchaser taking an instrument after maturity.
The section combines material found in sections 16, 28, 58 and 59
3
of the N.I.L. 6
Since the Code substitutes for presumptions aiding the holder,
a rule cutting off defenses, the last sentence in §16 of the N.I.L.
has been omitted as unnecessary."4 The burden of establishing any
defense in relation to delivery rests upon the defendant.
Under the Code, a holder not in due course takes the instrument subject to all claims to the instrument by third persons
whether legal or equitable in nature. Decisions which drew a distinction between equities of title (third party claims to the instrument) and equities of defense,protecting the purchaser after maturity who paid value without notice of an equity of title were based
upon an analogy to the bona fide purchaser rule in sales of chattels.
Although urged by some writers as applicable in the field of bills
and notes,; 5 the drafters felt that overdue instruments in fact do
not circulate freely and that no policy of the law requires that protection be extended to such a taker unless claiming through a holder
in due course. In short, circulation of overdue paper should not
be encouraged. The position taken in the Code would appear to
accord with the present weight of authority.
Paragraph (b) restates the first sentence of §58 of the N.I.L.,
and paragraph (c) condenses sections 16 and 28 of that act into a
single clause.
Paragraph (d) clarifies a point upon which considerable conflict had arisen under the N.I.L. The right of a primary party who
has no defense on the instrument to set up a defense available to
an intermediate party has caused the courts trouble. To define the
limits of the problem briefly: first, a plaintiff must establish his
63. N.D. Rev. Code § § 41-0216, 41-0305, 41-0508, 41-0509

(1943).

64. And where the instrument is no longer in the possesion of a party whosa signature
appears thereon, a valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is

proved. N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0206 (1943.
65. Chaffee, Rights in Overdue Paper, 31 Harv.L.Rev. 1104 (1918); Morrison, Equities
of Ownership and Equities of Defense in Overdue Paper,.5 Tulane L.Rev. 287 (1931);
Britton, Bills and Notes 738 et seq. (1943).
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title, and if any indorsement necessary to that title is forged or
missing he is not a holder and has the burden of establishing ownership. A defendant, of course, can raise these questions without
running afoul of any rules relating to the assertion of a "jus tertii."
Defenses based on the right of a third party can arise in several
ways. For example, a bearer instrument, or an instrument indorsed
in blank may be lost or stolen. Since public policy militates against
recovery by a thief, he has no standing in court and the obligor
can raise this defense whether or not the view is adopted that a
thief has title to such an instrument. The case of the thief constitutes the only exception to the rule that third party defenses are not
available to the obligor. While the case of the finder comes close
to the theft case, the drafters felt that the hardship in such a case
should rest on the person who lost the instrument when it was in
such form that a finder could become a holder. The transferee who
takes from a thief, whether for value after maturity, or as donee
or with notice if prior to maturity, stands in the shoes of the thief.
In this respect the Code is consistent. However, this one exception
to the general principle that the obligor cannot set up third party
defenses will result in changing the law of North Dakota. In
Farmer's State Bank v. Koffler, 6 the court held that a bank taking
a stolen check was entitled to recover without establishing its
status as a holder in due course. The court felt that a third party
defense would not overcome the presumption that the bank was a
holder in due course. But since the Code abandons the idea of such
a presumption and now permits the obligor to set up theft of the
instrument, the bank would be compelled under the Code to establish itself as a holder in due course. The change seems desirable.
The chance for collusion between plaintiff and the thief is too
great to sustain the charge that this rule will hamper negotiation.
Related to the theft case would the case of the embezzler who
misappropriates the instrument. The instrument may be indorsed to
an agent or received in trust. In all of these cases the Code requires
the obligor to pay the holder.
Another common situation is illustrated by §22 of the N.I.L.
which provides: "The indorsement or assignment of the instrument by a corporation or by an infant passes the property therein,
nothwithstanding that from want of capacity the corporation or
infant may incur no liability thereon." Under this section, although
the indorsement is void title passes and the obligor must pay the
66. 60 N.D. 11, 232 N.W. 307, 70 A.L.R. 1223 (1930).
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holder. The Code simply extends this principle to cover all grounds
for rescission of an indorsement whether based upon "incapacity,
fraud, duress, mistake, illegality, breach of trust or duty or any
other reason." In short, the rule includes all claims and defenses
listed under paragraphs a, b, and c.
The policy of the Code rests on the following considerations.
First, the obligor called upon for payment should have the right to
pay the holder and terminate the running of interest. If the right
to pay is denied his credit may be adversely affected by the circulation of the instrument after maturity. Secondly, the obligor
should not be compelled to fight another man's lawsuit. The evidence is not usually available to him, and the policy of the Code is
to compel the parties directly affected to litigate the questions at
issue. Thirdly, the obligation of the primary party is to pay the
holder and he is now compelled to do so, as much for his own
benefit as for the benefit of the holder. As pointed out by the
draftsmen, intervention by the third party claimant is the appropriate remedy, and nothing in the Code would prevent interpleader
or deposit in court by the defendant, thus enabling litigation by the
parties primarily interested.
This paragraph represents a distinct improvement over the
N.I.L. The requirement of that Act, that payment be made in due
course, 7 rendered the position of the payor with notice that the
holder's title might be defective unenviable indeed. If he paid
under the assumption that the holder's title was good, he ran the
risk that in a subsequent suit by the third party claimant the payment would be held in bad faith and have to pay over again. If,
on the other hand, he attempted to set up the outstanding equity
as a defense, he might fail because of insufficiency of evidence
where the claimant himself might have succeeded in establishing
the defense. The Code's solution is direct, simple, and fair to all
parties.
Section 3-307. BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING SIGNATURES,
DEFENSE AND DUE COURSE. (1) Unless specifically
denied in the pleadings each signature on an instrument is admitted. When the effectiveness of a signature is put in issue
(a) the burden of establishing it is on the party claiming
under the signature; but
(b) the signature is presumed to be genuine or authorized
except where the action is to enforce the obligation of a
67. See note 7,supra.
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purported signer who has died or become incompetent
before proof is required.
(2) When signatures are admitted or established, production
of the instrument entitles a holder to recover on it unless the
defendant establishes a defense.
(3) After evidence of a defense has been introduced a person
claiming the rights of a holder in due course has the burden
of establishing that he or some person under whom he claims is
in all respects a holder in due course.
The section restates the principle feature of §59 of the N.I.L.
on burden of proof as to holder in due course and adds important
new provisions.
The section is based upon the theory that no issue as to holder
in due course ever arises until a defense has been established by
the defendant. Production of the instrument by a holder and proof
of signatures placed in issue entitles him as holder to recover without the aid of any presumption as to being in due course. The
reference to defective title in §59 is replaced by the word "defense,"
a word that clearly draws no line between kinds of defenses. Thus,
a possible cause of trouble has been effectively removed. Under the
Code a holder not in due course takes subject to all defenses and
claims to the instrument on the part of third parties, subject to the
rule that each defendant must rely on his own personal defenses.
Only a holder who establishes his status as a holder in due course
takes free of defenses not classed as real defenses.
Subsection (1) presumably represents a change in the law of
North Dakota in relation to pleading. Our cases would seem to
indicate that a specific denial as to the validity of a particular signature would not be essential to put it in issue."8 The Code clearly
requires a specific denial as to the validity of a signature, and all
signatures not put in issue in this way are admitted. But even
though forgery or lack of authority in an agent to sign is raised by
specific denial, the Code raises a presumption of genuineness. To
overcome this presumption a defendant must introduce evidence
that would support a finding in his favor, and until he does that
plaintiff need not assume the burden of establishing the validity
of the signature. Of course, such a presumption will not arise
where the signer is deceased or incompetent, and this would include claims filed against the estate of a deceased or incompetent
person based upon a negotiable instrument.
68. Embden State Bank %,.-Schulze, 49 N.D. 777, 193 N.W. 481 (1923); cf. Vickery v.
Burton, 6 N.D. 425, 69 N.W. 193 (1896).
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The reason for the proposed change lies in the fact that the
forged or unauthorized signature represents the unusual case, and
the plaintiff frequently has no notice of the defense. The rule here
proposed will give him an opportunity to gather evidence to establish his case. The rule is practical and a time saver. It has no effect
on the right to amendment in a proper case.
If we assume that a defense has been established the holder
may do one of three things. He may rebut the defense. He may
seek to establish himself as a holder in due course - and no presumption aids him in this respect. Or finally, be may do nothing and
thus leave an issue for the jury or the court depending upon the
degree of proof submitted as to the defense relied upon.""
In summation, this Section restates and simplifies the problem
of burden of proof. The production of the instrument and the proof
of signatures put in issue by specific denial of their validity entitles
any holder to recover. The defendant bears the burden of overcoming this prima facie case by introducing evidence of a defense,
and before plaintiff need assume any burden on the issue of holder
in due course, the defendant must satisfy his burden by a preponderance of the evidence. When evidence as to a defense has
been introduced, the plaintiff has the same options facing him that
exist under present practice. He may seek to rebut the defense or
he may establish his status as a holder in due course. If he does
nothing the court may either leave the case to the jury or direct a
verdict for either party, depending upon the amount and the weight
°
of the evidence submitted by the defendant.
The writer is aware that the foregoing discussion on holder in
due course has followed rather closely the commentaries annexed
to the official draft, and this without extensive citation of authority.
Frankly, this has been an attempt on the writer's part to think
through the import of the Code, and any conclusions offered here
are based upon years of acquaintance with the subject as an instructor. It is therefore humbly suggested that the Code sections under
discussion here are a distinct advancement over corresponding sections in the Negotiable Instruments Law in at least three respects.
First, organization is better. Isolated sections of the N.I.L. relating
to the problem have been brought into proper focus by incorporation where they belong and where they can be found. Secondly,
69.
70.
plaintiff
as to a

Kerr v. Anderson, 16 N.D. 36, Ill
N.W. 614 (1907).
Kerr v. Anderson, supra note 69. However, it would appear that a verdict for the
would be required under the Code since defendant failed to introduce any evidence
defense.
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cumulative experience under the existing law has enabled the
drafters to avoid the ambiguities and inadequacies in expression of
ideas too common in the former act. Thirdly, the drafters have
made important policy decisions that wipe out substantial areas of
disagreement in case law. Incidentally, all this has been accomplished without increasing the bulkiness of the statute books, and
without radical change in the substantive law on the subject.
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